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COMMENTS
Leases by Non-Owners
The lease of a thing is a contract by which one party, the
lessor, undertakes to convey to another, the lessee, the enjoy-
ment of a thing during a certain period in return for a fixed
price.' The lessor is personally bound to furnish the lessee with
the enjoyment of the property during the lease term, and if the
lessee is disturbed in his possession of the property he has re-
course against the lessor. Thus a lease is basically a personal
contract under which the lessee receives an obligation of the
lessor to do.2 Followed to its logical conclusion, the notion that
1. LA. CIVII, CODE art. 2674 (1870).
2. 2 PLANIOL, CIviL LAW TREATISE (AN ENorIsn TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1707 (1959): "The right of the lessee
resulting from the obligation contracted towards him by the lessor is purely per-
sonal: it is a credit, the lessor is bound towards him by an obligation to do. The
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a lease is a personal contract would support the theory that a
person may lease property even though he has no connection
with it whatsoever. The lessee, having received the lessor's obli-
gation to maintain him in peaceful possession, would be entitled
to no more. On the other hand, even though a lessor does not
undertake to convey title, he does undertake to convey corporeal
possession. Consequently, it might be thought that, at least in
certain cases, he should be required to have a right to that cor-
poreal possession good against the true owner. This Comment
will consider some problems that arise in connection with the
rights of a lessee where the lessor has no right of possession valid
against the owner.
Articles 2681 and 2682
Article 2681 provides: "He who possesses a thing belonging
to another, may let it to a third person, but he cannot let it for
any other use than that to which it is usually applied." At first
glance it might appear that this article allows any possessor to
let property, even though he might not have a right to corporeal
possession good against the true owner.8 However, it would seem
that the possessor contemplated in Article 2681 is not an actual
owner or one who possesses as owner with no right against the
owner, but is one who has a right to possession good against the
true owner. In the first place, a lease deals with corporeal pos-
session and there is no good reason for saying that the possessor
mentioned in the article is necessarily one who possesses as own-
er. Secondly, the last clause of Article 2681, which provides "but
he cannot let it for any other use than that to which it is usually
applied," indicates that not only is the possessor a corporeal pos-
sessor, but he is one possessing under the right of the true owner.
A precarious possessor cannot lease property for a use to which
he does not have the right to put it in such a way as to bind the
true owner, and the prohibition against the possessor letting the
lessee does not acquire any real rights on the thing comparable to those of the
usufructuary and enforceable against everyone."
3. The problem of what situations are covered by Article 2681 has not re-
ceived careful attention in the cases. Article 2681 has been applied somewhat
indiscriminately in cases dealing with those who possess as owner and those who
possess through the owner. Thus it has been used in cases involving leases by
lessees, administrators, and possessors as owner. Weil v. Segura, 178 La. 421, 151
So. 639 (1933) (lessor sold property during lease) ; Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La.
754, 81 So. 302 (1919) (lease by lessee); Succession of Sparrow, 42 La. Ann.
500, 7 So. 611 (1890) (lease by administrator); Succession of-Myrick, 38 La.
Ann. 611 (1886) (lease by administrator) ; Paulding v. Dowell, 2 La. 452 (1831)
(lessor possessed as owner); Mathews v. Priest, 165 So. 535 (La. App. 1936)
(lessor sold property during lease).
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property for a use other than its usual use suggests that this is
what the codifiers had in mind. If the article is interpreted to
authorize leasing by those who possess the property of another
as owner, it becomes hard to find a reason for this last clause.
Presumably the clause gives someone the privilege of avoiding
the lease if the property is leased for such a use. But whom?
The true owner would already have the privilege of disregarding
any lease made by the possessor, so it seems doubtful that the
clause was intended for his benefit. If the privilege was ac-
corded the lessee, we must ask why it was given to him in the
case where the property is put to such a use when it was denied
him in other cases. There seems no good answer to this. It might
be said that the unusual use would expose him to an action in
damages by the true owner while a customary one would not,
but this seems rather tenuous.
Read in the suggested light, Article 2681 constitutes a defi-
nite recognition that a person who has the right to possession
against the owner can lease the property to another. However,
such a right is limited by the right of the owner to insist that it
not be let for a use other than that to which it is usually applied.
If the owner objects that the possessor has let the thing for such
a use, then the lessee's recourse is against the lessor on his war-
ranty of enjoyment "against the claim of the owner" under Ar-
ticle 2682.4 From this point of view, since the Code does not
specifically deal with the relationship between a lessee and a
lessor when the latter has no right to possession against the true
owner, the rights of such a lessee should be determined by the
general principles of lease and contract.
Absence of a Right to Possession as a Disturbance
Since a lease is basically a personal contract by virtue of
which the lessor guarantees to the lessee the peaceable enjoyment
of the premises, 5 a lessee should be in no position to complain as
long as his enjoyment is not disturbed. If, for example, the period
of the lease has expired and there has been no disturbance, the
lessee should not be entitled to recover from the lessor the rent
he has paid even though the lessor may have had no right to pos-
session of the property.6 By the same token, he should have no
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2682 (1870) : "He who lets out the property of another,
warrants the enjoyment of it against the claim of the owner."
5. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1707 (1959).
6. Sientes v. Odier, 17 La. Ann. 153 (1865) (lessee who discovered, after the
[Vol. XXI
COMMENTS
valid defense against an action for unpaid rent by the lessor.7
However, the lessee's enjoyment may be disturbed,8 and problems
arise as to what constitutes a "disturbance" and the recourse
available to the lessee if he is disturbed.
A lessor is not bound to protect the lessee against disturb-
ances by third persons claiming no right to the property.9 How-
ever, he warrants the lessee against the non-tortious acts of those
claiming a right.10 When the acts of such persons hinder the
lessee in his use of the property he has suffered a disturbance in
fact and should then be entitled to a reduction of the rent com-
mensurate with the disturbance," and to damages caused by it.12
If a suit is filed against the lessee asserting a right to the prop-
erty, the lessee may call the lessor in warranty and be dismissed
from the suit.13 If the action against the lessor is successful, it
results in a judgment of eviction from all or a part of the prop-
erty and the lessee is entitled to have the rent reduced propor-
tionately and to recover damages.' 4
A difficult problem arises when a valid right to possession
of the property exists in a third person but there has been no
physical interference with the lessee's possession. The question
then presented is whether the lessee may count himself disturbed.
At this point it might be helpful to consider the writings of some
of the French commentators on the subject of a lease by one who
has no right to possession. Broadly speaking there were two
expiration of the lease, that his lessor had no right to the property was not entitled
to recover rent paid under the lease).
7. Paulding v. Dowell, 2 La. 452 (1831) (lack of title in lessor held no de-
fense to suit for rent after the expiration of the lease).
8. One of the obligations of the lessor is to maintain the lessee in peaceful
possession. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2692 (1870).
9. Id. art. 2703: "The lessor is not bound to guarantee the lessee against dis-
turbances caused by persons not claiming any right to the premises; but in that
case the lessee has a right of action for damages sustained against the person
occasioning such disturbance."
10. Id. art. 2704: "If the persons by whom those acts of disturbance have been
committed, pretend to have a right to the thing leased, or if the lessee is cited to
appear before a court of justice to answer to the complaint of the person thus
claiming the whole or a part of the thing leased, or claiming some servitude on
the same, he shall call the lessor in warranty, and shall be dismissed from the suit
if he wishes it, by naming the person under whose rights he possesses."
11. This follows simply from the fact that rent is the lessee's payment for en-
joyment; to the -extent that he does not have the enjoyment, he should not have to
pay for it.
12. This follows from the fact that if the lessee is disturbed, the lessor has
breached his obligation to supply the peaceful possession, and so should respond
in damages as in the breach of any other obligation.
13. Id. art. 2704.
14. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1683 (1959).
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views on the subject among the writers examined. Some believed
that the lessee in such a lease should have rights analogous to
those of a vendee in the sale of the thing of another. 5 According-
ly, upon discovery that another had a right to the possession of
the property the lessee would be allowed to annul the lease and
recover damages from his lessor. Others maintained that the
lease of the thing of another should be valid because a lease is a
personal contract creating only an obligation to do in the lessor. 16
Even if there were an outstanding right to possession in a third
person, the lessee should not be allowed to annul the lease, be-
cause there is always a possibility that the lessor would be able
to furnish the possession. As an exception to this rule, they
thought that a lessee who had contracted in good faith and who
had leased the property for the purpose of establishing on it
some important work or business 17 should generally be allowed
to have the lease dissolved.' In such a case it was said that the
parties must have understood that the lessee would not have
peaceful enjoyment if he had to fear an eviction.
Neither of these views has been adopted or rejected by the
Louisiana jurisprudence. The case which comes closest to find-
ing a disturbance in such a situation is one which held that a
trapper threatened with arrest by a third party claimant was
entitled to count himself evicted. 19 Though the language of the
court20 indicates that the mere existence of the claim may have
15. 25 LAURENT, PRINCIPES no 56 (4th ed. 1887). Though the authors do not
take this view, a discussion of it may be found in BAUDRY-LACANTINER1E ET WAHL,
TRAITt THtIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, Du CONTRAT DE LOUAGE nos 125,
126, 127 (1906). Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl cites 1 DUVERGIER, no 82, and 4
CHAMPIONNItRE ET RIGAUD, no 3097 as taking the view that such a lease is
invalid.
16. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAIL, TRAIT THfORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL, Du CONTRAT DE LOUAGE nos 125, 126, 127 (1906); 7 DEMANTE, COURS
ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL no 159, his. II (1887) ; GUILLOUARD, TRAITE DU CON-
TRAT DE LOUAGE nor 52, 53 (3d ed. 1891).
17. Exactly what would be taken to constitute an important work or business
so as to fall within this exception is not certain. Apparently this rule would give
considerable flexibility to the judge in deciding whether or not the lease should be
set aside.
18. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl mentioned this exception, but did not favor
it. The other authors cited in note 16 supra advocated this exception. Some writers,
such as Guillouard, allowed another exception. When prior to the granting of the
lease the lessor had put himself in the possession of another's property and the
use to which it was being put operated to waste or despoil it, they allowed the
good faith lessee to have the lease annulled. This was based on the idea that no
one should be forced to participate in a fraud.
19. Board of Levee Commissioners for Orleans Levee District v. Dalton, 19
La. App. 490, 139 So. 487 (1932).
20. "In this case, the defendants'. possession was disturbed by Alpha's claim,
by his threats to institute suit and of arresting any one sent on the property by
defendant." Id. at 492, 139 So. at 488.
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weighed somewhat in justifying the trapper's refusal to take
possession, the determinative factor was probably the threat of
arrest. No case was discovered that dealt expressly with the
question of whether an outstanding claim might amount to a
disturbance. However there have been cases where the lessee in
physical possession has sought to avoid his lease obligations and
the courts have stated that one in peaceful possession cannot
contest his lessor's title,21 thus the courts seem to be proceeding
on the idea that such a lessee is in peaceful possession even if his
lessor has no right to possession.
It seems that the courts could go farther than they have done
in a finding of disturbance. In many cases it is plain that knowl-
edge of an outstanding right would impede the lessee in his phys-
ical use of the property. Then, too, it is doubtful that the parties
to most leases contemplate that the lessee is obligated to remain
on the property and pay rent even if he discovers that a third
person has a right to possess the property. Whether a finding
of disturbance should be limited to cases of the nature of the
French exception previously mentioned is difficult to say. It
would seem to this writer that whenever the purpose for which
the property was leased indicates that the lessee would not have
contracted if he had known that his lessor had no right, the out-
standing right should amount to a disturbance. Of course, if the
lessee was aware of the absence of a right of possession at the
time of the lease, he should have no complaint.
The question remains as to whether the idea that a valid out-
standing right in a third person constitutes a disturbance would
fit into our jurisprudence. To answer this it is necessary to
examine some of the rules which have evolved. A number of
cases may be found announcing that a lessee in peaceful posses-
sion may not contest his lessor's title.2 2 Sometimes the court
21. Lacaze v. Beeman, 178 So. 660 (La. App. 1938) ; Mathews v. Priest, 165
So. 535 (La. App. 1936). Some cases have simply said that a lessee in possession
may not contest his lessor's title. Thomas v. Jackson, 158 La. 1019, 105 So. 49
(1925) ; Davidson v. Fletcher, 130 La. 668, 58 So. 504 (1912) ; Campbell v. Hart,
118 La. 871, 43 So. 533 (1907). But it would seem the basis of decision in these
cases has been the idea that such a lessee is in peaceful possession, because it has
been held that a lessee whose possession is disturbed may contest his lessor's title.
Board of Levee Commissioners for Orleans Levee Dist. v. Dalton, 139 So. 487 (La.
App. 1932).
22. Thomas v. Jackson, 158 La. 1019, 105 So. 49 (1925) ; Davidson v. Fletcher,
130 La. 668, 58 So. 504 (1912) ; Campbell v. Hart, 118 La. 871, 43 So. 533
(1907) ; Tippett v. Jett, 10 La. 359 (1836) ; Lacaze v. Beeman, 178 So. 660 (La.
App. 1938) ; Mathews v. Priest, 165 So. 535 (La. App. 1936) ; Federal Land Bank
v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La. App. 1935). As pointed out in note 21 supra, though
1961]
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states that he is estopped from contesting his lessor's title. 28
These cases usually involve a lessee in physical possession of the
property who is attempting to avoid the payment of rent. Since
a lessee is entitled only to possession, he should have no com-
plaint that his lessor has no title to the property, provided the
lessor has a right to its possession. Thus the rule might be more
accurately stated: A lessee in peaceful possession cannot contest
his lessor's right to possession. Put in these terms the rule
simply says that so long as the lessee is receiving what he bar-
gained for, i.e., peaceful possession, he has no complaint. This
is probably all that the courts have in mind, even though they do
speak in terms of title. The estoppel idea seems to go farther
than simply saying that the lessee cannot complain because he
obtained what he bargained for. It might well represent a con-
clusion that basic fair play and policy require that so long as
the lessee keeps what was surrendered to him under the lease,
he should not be able to withhold the rent.
24
There is no reason why the idea that an outstanding right
to possession constitutes a disturbance should conflict with these
rules. If the lessee has not been prevented from putting the
premises to the use for which they were rented, it would seem
that the outstanding claim has not in fact disturbed him. If,
acting as the parties would have expected him to act when faced
with such a claim, he refrained from putting the premises to
their intended use, it would seem that he has been disturbed. In
this case he should be able to sue for the dissolution of the lease,
provided that he has surrendered possession. Or, he ought to be
able to sue for the dissolution of the lease while in possession if
he has continued to pay rent. He should not be permitted to sue
for dissolution of the lease or defeat an action for rent while
retaining possession of the lease and refusing to pay rent. The
lessor having given possession ought to have it returned to him
when the lessee refuses to pay rent. To allow the lessee to retain
possession of the property and withhold the rent while a determi-
all of these cases do not mention peaceful possession, they seem to be based on
the understanding that the lessee in physical -possession is in peaceful possession.
23. Thomas v. Jackson, 158 La. 1019, 105 So. 49 (1925) ; Davidson v. Fletcher,
130 La. .668, 58 So. 504 (1912) ; Morgan City v. Dalton, 112 La. 9, 36 So. 208
(1904) ; Federal Land Bank v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La. App. '1935).
24. Sometimes a court says that the lessee, having recognized the lessor's -right
to lease, .cannot question it while holding the property. There is probably more
behind the rule, however, than just the -idea that by taking the -lease the lessee has
recognized the lessor's right. To allow a lessee to withhold the rent and 'keep the
possession while forcing the lessor to show a right to that possession would cer-
tainly open the way for lessees to take advantage of lessors.
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nation of whether there has been a disturbance is made would
seem to favor lessees too greatly. This result could be reached
by saying that such a lessee is estopped to maintain that he has
been disturbed. If the lessee remained on the property a suffi-
cient length of time after discovering the outstanding right and
without notifying the lessor, he might be held to have waived the
disturbance. However, if the lessee has notified the lessor and
retained possession while waiting for the lessor to guard him
against the claim, no waiver should be found. Damages, where
sustained, would seem to be recoverable by the lessee as in the
case of any disturbance.
Assertion of a Right by the Lessee
Heretofore the discussion has centered around the situation
where the outstanding title was in a third person. A somewhat
different situation is presented where a lessee seeks to assert a
title or right to possession contradictorily to his lessor. Suppose,
for instance, the lessee purchases a title carrying with it a right
to possession, or discovers that he has such a title or right dur-
ing the lease. The fact that a man has at one time been a lessee
of property does not prevent him from asserting a right against
his lessor.25 Nor does it seem that he is barred from acquiring,
during the lease term, a right or title to the property adverse to
that of his lessor. What he may not do under the jurisprudence
is remain in possession and refuse to pay rent on the ground that
he now possesses under some other right.2 6 This rule has been
supported on the theory that to allow him to do this would be to
allow him to change the nature of his possession by his own act
in contravention of the Code .2  Estoppel has also been invoked
25. Banks v. Yarborough, 104 So.2d 283 (La. App. 1958).
26. Federal Land Bank v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La. App. 1935) (lessee who
held over could not assert a lease which he had acquired from a third person as
a defense to a suit for ejectment by his original lessor).
27. Campbell v. Hart, 118 La. 871, 43 So. 533 (1907) ; Williams v. Douglas &
Rooks, 11 La. Ann. 632 (1856) ; Federal Land Bank v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La.
App. 1935). There are several articles in the Code that indicate that such action
on the part of a lessee might be prohibited. Examples are Articles 3441, 3446,
3514. Article 3514 speaks specifically of the contract of lease and provides: "One
can not prescribe against his own title, in the sense, that he can not change by
his own act the nature and the origin of his possession. Thus, he whose possession
is founded on a contract of lease which is adduced, is considered as always pos-
sessing by the same title, and can not prescribe by any length of time." It is doubt-
ful that this and similar articles were meant to stand for the proposition that a
lessee cannot assert a title as a defense to the payment of rent while remaining
in its possession. To see this it is necessary to look at the rules of prescription,
which it would seem the codifiers had in mind when enacting such articles. As a
general principle, only one who possesses for himself may acquire by way of
acquisitive prescription. Thus a precarious possessor cannot acquire by way of
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in such cases. Neither of these rules would seem to prevent a
lessee who had surrendered possession of the property before
the end of the lease from asserting a right to possession. The
question of whether he could terminate his rent obligation for the
remainder of the lease by proving such a right in himself is a
troublesome one. It does not seem that the lessee should be
counted as a third person, the existence of a claim in whom might
be a disturbance. Thus a lessee who discovered that he had a
valid right to possession or who purchased such right during the
existence of the lease could not say that he was disturbed by the
existence of a valid claim in himself. Such a lessee might argue
that rent is only due for possession obtained under the lease and
that, having shown a right to possession, his possession should
henceforth be in his own right and not under the lease. However,
the lessee should not be able to make performance by the lessor
impossible and then claim that the failure to perform relieves
him of his obligations. There would seem to be one case in which
the lessee should be able to acquire a right and terminate his
lease obligations by surrendering possession. This is where the
existence of a valid claim in another constitutes a disturbance
and the lessor, after having been given notice by the lessee, fails
to take adequate steps to stop, the disturbance. Here the lessee
would be relieved of his rent obligation, not by the acquisition of
the claim but by the lessor's failure to guard him against a
disturbance.
Robert B. Butler, III
acquisitive prescription because he possesses for another. Once a man has begun
to possess for another it is presumed that he continues to possess for that other.
Nevertheless, the French Civil Code provides for two cases where the precarious
possessor may acquire the right to prescribe. These are when the nature of his
possession is changed by the acts of a third person or when he sets up an adverse
claim against the owner. In both cases the precarious possessor must make it clear
to the one for whom he had possessed that he now holds in his own right. Then
he possesses for himself. Article 3512 indicates that the codifiers intended to make
at least one of these French exceptions the law of Louisiana. It provides that
"precarious possessors may prescribe when the cause of their possession is changed
by the act of a third person; as if a farmer, for example, acquires from another
the estate which he rented, for if he refuse afterwards to pay the rent, if he de-
clare to the lessor that he will no longer hold the estate under him but that he
chooses to enjoy it as his own, this will be a change of his possession by an ex-
ternal act, which'shall suffice to give a beginning to the prescription." Thus it
would seem that where a lessee buys the property from one other than the lessor
and refuses to pay rent he then possesses for himself. This does not mean that
his lessor should not be able to evict him. It only means that the proper ground
for eviction is not a rule saying that the lessee cannot change the nature of his
possession by his own act.
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